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MARIA VAN WAGENBERG, LAWRENCE WARD*

I. Introduction
This Article summarizes important developments in 2016 in export
controls and economic sanctions, including developments surrounding
United States economic sanctions regulations and trade embargoes,
international traffic in arms regulations, and export administration
regulations. The article also discusses voluntary United States selfdisclosure program for willful violations and changes to Canadian sanctions
programs.

H. Developments Involving the Economic Sanctions Regulations
and Trade Embargoes Administered by the United States
Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets
Control
A.

CUBA SANCTIONS

In 2016, the United States Treasury Department's Office of Foreign
Assets Control (OFAC) issued three rules to amend its Cuban Assets
Control Regulations (CACR). First, on January 27, 2016, OFAC published
a final rule that: removed financial restrictions for non-agricultural exports;
expanded air carrier services; expanded travel authorizations to Cuba
pertaining to professional meetings, public performances, clinics, workshops,
exhibitions, and athletic and other competitions; and expanded the list of
authorized humanitarian projects to include disaster preparedness and
response.'
Second, on March 16, 2016, OFAC promulgated a final rule that: further
eased restrictions on certain economic activity with Cuba (e.g., authorization
for U.S. financial institutions to open and maintain bank accounts in the
United States for Cuban nationals in Cuba to receive payments in the
United States for authorized transactions and to process "U-Turn"
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transactions in which Cuba or a Cuban national has an interest); established
new opportunities for persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction to establish a
physical and/or business presence in Cuba for certain kinds of activities (e.g.,
physical presence authorization for humanitarian projects and noncommercial activities intended to provide support for the Cuban people, and
business presence authorization for exporters of goods that are authorized
for export or re-export to Cuba and certain other kinds of entities that
facilitate authorized transactions); and expanded the authorization to travel
to Cuba for certain kinds of educational purposes. 2
Finally, on October 17, 2016, OFAC issued a final rule that served to
expand opportunities for scientific collaboration by authorizing certain
transactions related to Cuban-origin pharmaceuticals and joint medical
research; improve living conditions for Cubans by expanding existing
authorizations for grants and humanitarian-related services; increase peopleto-people contact in Cuba by facilitating authorized travel and commerce;
facilitate safe travel between the United States and Cuba by authorizing civil
aviation safety-related services; and bolster trade and commercial
opportunities by expanding and streamlining authorizations relating to trade
and commerce. 3
B.

IRAN SANCTIONS

On January 16, 2016, the United States and the European Union lifted
certain nuclear-related sanctions on Iran in connection with the so-called
"Iran deal," otherwise known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA) between Iran and the "E3/EU+3" (the European Union, France,
Germany, the United Kingdom, China, Russia, and the United States), to
ensure Iran's nuclear program would be used only for peaceful purposes.4
Sanctions were lifted on the same day that the International Atomic Energy
Association (IAEA) reported it had verified Iran's compliance with certain
nuclear-related measures outlined in the JCPOA (a day known as
Implementation Day under the agreement).5
The JCPOA was negotiated pursuant to the framework set out in a
November 24, 2013 interim agreement entitled the Joint Plan of Action
(JPOA), which allowed for limited sanctions relief in exchange for a short2. CACR, 81 Fed. Reg. 13,989 - 13,994 (Mar. 16, 2016 (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 515).
3. CACR, 81 Fed. Reg. 71,372 (Oct. 17, 2016) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 515).
4. Joint Statement, EU High Representative Federica Mogherini and Iranian Foreign
Minister Javad Zarif Gan. 01, 2016), https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquartershomepage/2991/joint-statement-by-eu-high-representative-federica-mogherini-and-iranianforeign-minister-javad-zarifen.
5. Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Verification and Monitoring

in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015),
U.N. doc S/2016/57, annex and enclosure (Jan. 19, 2016); Press Statement, John F. Kerry, Sec'y
of State, Confirmation of Verification of Iranian Actions Pursuant to the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action Jan. 16, 2016), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/251545.pdf.
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6
term suspension of certain parts of Iran's nuclear program. The parties
subsequently agreed to the broad parameters of the JCPOA on July 14,
2015, including the types of sanctions-related commitments to be
undertaken by the United States and the European Union on
Implementation Day.7
In particular, the U.S. government announced the following limited Iran
sanctions relief measures on Implementation Day:

1. Relaxation of Nuclear-Related Secondary Sanctions: The U.S.
government relaxed its nuclear-related "secondary sanctions" on Iran,
which previously allowed the U.S. government to impose certain
penalties on non-U.S. persons operating outside of U.S. jurisdiction in
specific, targeted Iranian sectors. The relaxations were implemented
through two mechanisms: (i) the President's issuance of Executive
Order 13716, which revoked Executive Orders 13574, 13590, 13622,
and 13645 with respect to Iran and also re-authorized sanctions
authorities for certain non-nuclear sanctions;8 and (ii) the State
Department's exercise of its waiver authorities under certain statutory
sanctions on Iran.9 As a result, non-U.S. persons generally would no
longer be subject to secondary sanctions for engaging in activities
outside of U.S. jurisdiction involving the following:
a) Iran's financial and banking sectors;
b) the provision of certain insurance, reinsurance, and underwriting
services;
c) Iran's energy, petroleum, and petrochemical sectors;
d) Iran's shipping and shipbuilding sectors and port operators;
e) trade with Iran in gold and other precious metals;
f) trade with Iran in certain "materials" (including graphite, raw or
semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, coal, and certain
software), except that the transfer of certain materials to Iran must be
approved by the Procurement Channel established by the JCPOA, and
any materials may not be used in connection with Iran's military or
ballistic missile programs; or
g) Iran's automotive sector.
Secondary sanctions continue to apply to (a) the above activities to the
extent any sanctioned persons known as Specially Designated Nationals
6. P5+1, EU, and Iran, Joint Plan of Action, (Nov. 24, 2013), http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/
20
docs/statements/docs/ 13/131124_03 en.pdf; Resource Center, Joint Plan of Action JPOA)
Archive and Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) Archive (Jan. 16, 2016), https://www
.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/jpoa-archive.aspx.
7. Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, July 14, 2016, https://www.state.gov/documents/
3
organization/245 17.pdf.
8. Exec. Order No. 13716, 81 Fed. Reg. 3693 Gan. 16, 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/cpoa-eo.pdf.
9. U.S. Dep't. of State, JCPOA Contingent Waivers (Oct. 18, 2015), https://www.state.gov/
e/eb/rls/othr/2015/248320.htm.; see supra, note 5, Confirmation of Verification of Iranian
Actions Pursuant to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

Published by SMU Scholar, 2017

3

The Year in Review, Vol. 51, No. 1 [2017], Art. 4
26

THE YEAR IN REVIEW

[VOL. 51

(SDNs) are involved; (b) certain activities contributing to WMD
proliferation, terrorism, human rights abuses, corruption, censorship,
and unrest in Syria or Yemen, which are subject to separate secondary
sanctions that were not lifted or waived; and (c) in any context where a
party provides "significant financial, material technological, or other
support to, or goods or services in support of any activity or transaction
on behalf of or for the benefit of" any Iranian person on OFAC's List of
Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN List).o
2. Removal of Parties from Sanctions Lists: In addition, OFAC removed
several hundred Iranian parties from the SDN List, Foreign Sanctions
Evaders List (FSE List), and Non-SDN Iran Sanctions Act List."
OFAC transferred some of the former Iranian SDNs to a separate
sanctions list known as the List of Persons Identified as Blocked Solely
Pursuant to Executive Order 13599 (E.O. 13599 List). The E.O. 13599
List includes Iranian SDNs designated solely pursuant to the Iranian
Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 560 (ITSR),
under the authority of E.O. 13599, based on their status as an Iranian
financial institution or a Government of Iran party. United States
persons continue to be broadly prohibited from engaging in
transactions with any party in Iran and must block any E.O. 13599 List
party's property or interest in property that comes within the United
States or the possession/control of a U.S. person. As a result, the
primary effect of delisting these parties from the SDN List was to
remove the risk that non-U.S. persons operating outside U.S.
jurisdiction could be "collaterally" designated as SDNs for materially
supporting such listed SDNs or that foreign financial institutions could
suffer sanctions for processing transactions for such SDNs.12 In
addition, the de-listings carry potential implications for the SEC
reporting requirements pursuant to Section 219 of the Iranian Threat
Reduction and Syrian Human Rights Act of 2012 (ITRA),13 in relation
to transactions or dealings with listed SDN parties.
3. General License H for United States-Owned or -Controlled
Entities: OFAC also issued General License H, which authorized nonU.S. entities owned or controlled by U.S. persons to engage in Iran-

10. Exec. Order No. 13716, supra note 8, at § (a)(i); U.S. Dep't. of Treasury and U.S. Dep't. of
State, Guidance Relating To The Lifting of Certain U.S. Sanctions Pursuant To The Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action on Implementation Day (an. 16, 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/implement-guide jcpoa.pdf.
11. Office of Foreign Assets Control, JCPOA-related Designation Removals, JCPOA
Designation Updates, Foreign Sanction Evaders Removals, NS-ISA List Removals; 13599 List
Changes (Jan. 16, 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFACEnforcement/Pages/updated-names.aspx.
12. See Guidance Relating to the Lifting of Certain U.S. Sanctions Pursuant to the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action on Implementation Day supra note 10, at 26-28.
13. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § (r), 15 U.S.C. 78(m) (2017).
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related transactions, subject to certain conditions.14 These conditions
include the restrictions on involvement of any of the following:
a) U.S. persons (except in limited circumstances involving the
alteration or establishment of corporate policies and the provision of
"automated" and "globally integrated" business support systems);
b) funds transfers to, from, or through any U.S. financial institution
(including most transactions settled or processed in U.S. dollars);
c) parties on the SDN List or FSE List;
d) military, paramilitary, intelligence, or law enforcement entities of
the Government of Iran or any agents or affiliates thereof;
e) exports from the United States, or re-exports from third countries,
of goods, services, or technology that are subject to export restrictions
under the ITSR or the Export Administration Regulations (EAR)
(including certain transactions involving parties on the Commerce
Department's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Denied Persons'
List or Entity List); and
f) activities subject to other sanctions targeting Iran, including those
relating to WMD proliferation, ballistic missiles, and terrorism.
Non-U.S. entities owned or controlled by U.S. persons first became
subject to the ITSR's prohibitions in October 2012, pursuant to section 218
of the ITRA.'5 Thus, General License H represents a partial return to the
scope of sanctions applicable to such non-U.S. entities before October 2012.
4. General Licenses for Iranian Carpet and Foodstuffs: OFAC reinstated certain general licenses in the ITSR relating to Iranian-origin
carpets and foodstuffs.16

5. Commercial Aviation Licensing Policy: OFAC also issued a
Statement of Licensing Policy for Activities Related to the Export/
Reexport to Iran of Commercial Passenger Aircraft and Related Parts
and Services (Aviation SLP), which expanded on the available favorable
licensing policy issued under the JPOA for safe operation of Iranian
commercial passenger aircraft.'1 The Aviation SLP allows U.S. persons
and, where there is a nexus to U.S. jurisdiction, non-U.S. persons to
apply for specific licenses from OFAC to export, re-export, sell, lease, or
transfer to Iran commercial passenger aircraft for exclusively civil
aviation or spare parts/components for commercial passenger aircraft,
as well as to provide associated services (e.g., warranty, maintenance,
14. Office of Foreign Assets Control, Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations,
General License H, Authorizing Certain Transactions Relating to Foreign Entities Owned or
Controlled by a United States Person, 31 C.F.R. pt. 560.
15. Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-158, § 218,
126 Stat. 1214, 1234-35 (2012).
16. Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 81 Fed. Reg. 3330-33 (to be codified at
31 C.F.R. pt. 560 and Appendix A to Chapter V) (Jan. 21, 2016).
17. Office of Foreign Assets Control, Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31
C.F.R. pt. 560, Statement of Licensing Policy For Activities Related to the Export or Re-export
to Iran of Commercial Passenger Aircraft and Related Parts and Services (Jan. 16, 2016).
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Separate

Importantly, while the U.S. government lifted certain "secondary
sanctions" targeting non-U.S. persons (and also authorized most Iranrelated transactions by non-U.S. entities owned or controlled by U.S.
persons), U.S. persons remain prohibited from engaging in virtually any
Iran-related transactions, under the "primary sanctions" on Iran
implemented pursuant to the ITSR. In addition, certain financial sanctions
continue to be applicable under the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations
(IFSR), 31 C.F.R. part 561, for foreign financial institutions that process
targeted transactions for Iranian SDNs and certain other sanctioned
activities.
Since implementation of the JCPOA, OFAC issued two additional general
licenses in the context of civil aviation:
a. General License I (issued March 24, 2016) authorizes U.S. persons
to negotiate and enter into contracts for activities eligible for the
Aviation SLP, provided performance under the contract is made
contingent on authorization under a specific license issued by OFAC.18
b. General License J (issued July 29, 2016) authorizes the re-export by
non-U.S. persons of certain aircraft to Iran on temporary sojourn of no
more than 72 hours, subject to certain conditions.19 The aircraft must
be a fixed-wing civil aircraft that is of U.S. origin or contains more than
10% controlled U.S. content and that is registered outside the United
States in a non-sanctioned country (i.e., a country that is not in Country
Group E:1 of Supplement No. I to Part 740 of the EAR). The nonU.S. person re-export must also maintain the rights to hire/fire the
cockpit crew, dispatch the aircraft, and determine the flight route,
among other conditions. The regulatory authorization for temporary
sojourns of aircraft in Iran is now similar to that available for other
sanctioned countries under License Exception AVS under Section
740.15 of the EAR.
C.

LIFTING

OF BURMA SANCTIONS

On September 15, 2016, during State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi's visit
to Washington D.C., President Obama announced plans to lift U.S.
sanctions on Burma in recognition of the country's progress toward
18. Office of Foreign Assets Control, Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulation, 31
C.F.R. pt. 560, Authorizing Certain Transactions Related to the Negotiation of, and Entry into,
Contingent Contracts for Activities Eligible for Authorization Under the Statement of
Licensing Policy for Activities Related to the Export or Re-export to Iran of Commercial
Passenger Aircraft and Related Parts and Services (Mar. 24, 2016).
19. Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulation, 31 C.F.R. pt. 560, General License J,
Authorizing the Reexportation of Certain Civil Aircraft to Iran on Temporary Sojourn and

Related Transactions (July 29, 2016).
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democratic governance. 20 On October 7, 2016, U.S. sanctions against
Burma were formally terminated when President Obama issued Executive
Order 13742, which: (1) terminated the national emergency with respect to
Burma that had been declared in Executive Order 13047 of May 20, 1997;
(2) revoked Executive Orders 13310, 13448, 13464, 13619, and 13651; (3)
waived the sanctions under Section 5(b) of the Tom Lantos Block Burmese
JADE (Junta's Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008;21 and (4) terminated
the visa bans implemented under Presidential Proclamation 8693 of July 24,
2011.22 As a result, the U.S. sanctions on Burma are no longer in effect.
OFAC has announced that the Burmese Sanctions Regulations (BSR), 31
C.F.R. part 537, will be removed from the Code of Federal Regulations and
that all parties designated as SDNs solely pursuant to the BSR have been
removed from the SDN List. In addition, the State Department's
Responsible Investment Reporting Requirements now apply on a voluntary
basis only. Although Burma continues to be designated by the Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) as "jurisdiction of primary money
laundering concern" under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, FinCEN
has issued an administrative exception, which allows corresponding accounts
for Burmese banks, subject to certain due diligence requirements.23
Before the termination of the U.S. sanctions against Burma, the U.S.
government had taken significant steps toward liberalizing the sanctions.
For example, on May 18, 2016, OFAC issued or expanded general licenses
authorizing transactions relating to U.S. persons residing in Burma, exports
to and from Burma, and movement within Burma; as well as most
transactions involving blocked Burmese banks.24
D.

EXPANSION OF NORTH KOREA SANCTIONS

Following an additional nuclear test by North Korea on January 6, 2016,
and a rocket launch using ballistic missile technology on February 7, 2016,
the U.S. government expanded its existing sanctions on North Korea to
impose a comprehensive embargo on the country. On March 15, 2016,
President Obama issued Executive Order 13722,25 which: (1) blocks the
property of the Government of North Korea and the Workers' Party of
Korea; (2) prohibits exports or re-exports from the United States or by U.S.
persons of goods, services (including financial services), and technology to
20. Grace Aranow, President Obama and Aung San Suu Kyi Celebrate Progress in Burma (Sept.
6 9
15, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/201 /0 /15/president-obama-and-dawaung-san-suu-kyi-celebrate-burmese-progress.
21. Tom Lantos Block Burmese Jade (Juanta's Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008, Pub. L.
110-286, 122 Stat. 2631-48.
22. Exec. Order 13472, 81 Fed. Reg. 70953 (Oct. 7, 2016).
23. Imposition of Special Measures Against Burma, 69 Fed. Reg. 19093 (Apr. 12, 2004) (to be
codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 103).
24. Burmese Sanctions Regulation, 81 Fed. Reg. 31169 (May 18, 2016) (to be codified at 31
C.F.R. pt. 537).
25. Exec. Order 13722, 81 Fed. Reg. 14943 (Mar. 18, 2016).
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North Korea; (3) prohibits new investment in North Korea by U.S. persons;
and (4) expands the criteria under which parties may be designated as SDNs
for engaging in North Korea-related activities. Executive Order 13722
implements provisions of the North Korea Sanctions and Policy
Enhancement Act of 201626 and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2270
(2016).27 As a result, U.S. persons are prohibited from engaging in virtually
all transactions involving North Korea.
E.

OTHER

OFAC

DEVELOPMENTS

In 2016, OFAC issued regulations to implement sanctions on Burundirelated SDNs (the Burundi Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 554),
under Executive Order 13712 of November 22, 2015 ("Blocking the
Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Burundi").28
In addition, OFAC issued regulations to implement the Hizballah
International Financing Prevention Act of 2015 (Hizballah Financial
Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 566), which authorize financial
sanctions on foreign financial institutions that knowingly facilitate certain
significant transactions or engage in money-laundering for Hizballah or
affiliated SDNs.29
Finally, the OFAC sanctions against Cote d'Ivoire-related SDNs were
lifted under Executive Order 13739,30 terminating the national emergency
with respect to the situation in Cote d'Ivoire.
F.

OFAC

ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

OFAC took several notable enforcement actions in 2016, which continued
to focus on the parties' lack of reasonable due diligence or their general level
of wrongdoing. In the former category, Barclays Bank PLC agreed to a civil
liability settlement of approximately USD 2.49 million, for alleged violations
arising from transactions processed to or through the United States for
Barclays Bank of Zimbabwe corporate customers that were 50 percent-ormore owned by SDNs (and are therefore deemed blocked by operation of
law).3' The bank did not identify the ultimate beneficial ownership by
SDNs because of its failure to collect this information or to upload it from
paper files to an electronic system, which was screened outside Zimbabwe
26. North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancements Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-122, 130
Stat. 93.
27. S.C. Res. 2270 (Mar. 2, 2016).
28. Burundi Sanctions Regulations, 81 Fed. Reg. 19878 (Apr. 6, 2016) (to be codified at 31
C.F.R. pt. 554).
29. Hizballah International Financing Prevention Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114-102, 129 Stat.
2205.
30. Exec. Order 13739, 81 Fed. Reg. 63673 (Sept. 14, 2016).
31. OFAC Enforcement Information: Barklays Bank Plc Settles Potential Civil Liability For
Apparent Violations of the Zimbabwe Sanctions Regulations (Feb. 8, 2016), https://www
.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/CivPen/Documents/20160208_barclays.pdf.
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due to local regulations prohibiting compliance with U.S. sanctions and incountry screening. The case was determined to be "non-egregious," even
though Barclays processed additional transactions for the blocked persons
after U.S. financial institutions blocked transactions for those persons and
the bank had confirmed the blocked status of its customers.
OFAC also took several enforcement actions against agricultural and
medical companies that did not comply with available OFAC licensing
provisions. Of particular note, the PanAmerican Seed Company agreed to a
civil liability settlement of USD 4.32 million for alleged violations arising
from indirect exports of seeds (primarily flower seeds) to two Iranian
distributors, via Europe and the Middle East.32 The penalty far exceeded the
total value of the exports, which was valued over $770,000 in "economic
benefit to Iran." The case was not voluntarily self-disclosed and was deemed
"egregious," due to the awareness by several mid-level managers of the
misconduct and the systematic concealment of the involvement of Iran.
II. Developments Involving the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations

A.

REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS

In furtherance of the Export Control Reform (ECR) Initiative's goals of
providing clarity and harmonizing key concepts among export agencies, the
State Department's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC)
published an interim final rule on June 3, 2016, changing and adding
definitions of key terms used in the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations (ITAR).33 The existing definitions of "export" and "reexport"
were revised, while "release" and "retransfer" received their own definitions
(new sections 120.50 and 120.51), in order to better describe and distinguish
between the various types of transactions subject to the ITAR, both in the
United States and abroad.34 In a final rule issued three months later, DDTC
made several additional clarifications and corrections responsive to
comments submitted following the interim final rule.3s In what appears to

be a shift from its previous approach regarding mere "access" to technical
data being an ITAR-controlled event, DDTC has now "confirm[ed] that
theoretical or potential access to technical data is not a release"36 for
purposes of the ITAR's approach to "deemed exports." Several other ITAR
32. OFAC Enforcement Information: PanAmerican Seed Company Settles Potential Civil
Liability for Alleged Violations of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (Sept. 13,
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/CivPen/Documents/
2016),

20160913_panam.pdf.
33. International Traffic in Arms: Revisions to Definition of Export and Related Definition,

81 Fed. Reg. 35611 (une 3, 2016) (to be codified at 22 C.F.R. 120, 123, 124, 125, and 126).
34. Id. at 35,612-14.
35. International Traffic in Arms: Revisions to Definition of Export and Related Definitions,

81 Fed. Reg. 62004 (Sept. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 22 C.F.R. pts. 120, 125, 126, and 130).
36. Id. at 62,005.
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terms for which revised or new definitions have been proposed, such as
"defense service," "technical data," "public domain," and "fundamental
research,"37 are still under U.S. government review and will be the subject of
separate rulemakings.
DDTC also made several ECR-related changes to the U.S. Munitions
List (USML) in 2016. First, a final rule promulgated on July 28, 2016,
amended and clarified USML Categories XIV (Toxicological Agents,
Including Chemical Agents, Biological Agents, and Associated Equipment)
and XVIII (Directed Energy Weapons).38 Among other changes, this rule
reflected the migration of riot control agents and certain detection,
remediation, and protective equipment from the USML to the EAR's
Commerce Control List (CCL). Second, DDTC revised USML Category
XII (Fire Control, Laser, Imaging, and Guidance Equipment) on October
12, 2016.39 The amended Category XII excludes certain items having
potential civilian uses (largely now on the CCL), and includes a number of
specific defense articles that DDTC chose to move from Categories VIII
(Aircraft and Associated Equipment), XIII (Auxiliary Military Equipment),
and XV (Spacecraft Systems and Associated Equipment). Finally, a
November 21, 2016 rulemaking amended USML Categories VIII (Aircraft
and Related Articles) and XIX (Gas Turbine Engines and Associated
Equipment).40 The latest changes, which related chiefly to specific military
aircraft components and subsystems, were intended to provide clarity,
account for technological developments, and ensure that controls are
calibrated to protect national security while accommodating legitimate civil
uses and goals.
A rulemaking published on August 17, 2016, clarified how exports of
items subject to the EAR may be exported under an ITAR license or
exemption in certain cases, revised the destination control statement in the
ITAR to reflect the corresponding statement in the EAR, and made several
administrative and conforming changes, as part of ECR.41
37. International Traffic in Arms: Revisions to Definitions of Defense Services, Technical
Data, and Public Domain; Definition of Product of Fundamental Research; Electronic
Transmission and Storage of Technical Data; and Related Definitions, 80 Fed. Reg. 31,525
(June 3, 2015) (to be codified at 22 C.F.R. pts. 120, 123, 125, and 127).
38. Amendments to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Revision of U.S. Munitions
List Categories XIV and XVIII, 81 Fed. Reg. 49,531 (uly 28, 2016) (to be codified at 22 C.F.R.
pt. 121).
39. Amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Revision of U.S. Munitions
List Category XII, 81 Fed. Reg. 70,340 (Oct. 12, 2016) (to be codified at 22 C.F.R. pt. 121).
40. Amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Revision of U.S. Munitions
List Categories VIII and XIX, 81 Fed. Reg. 83126 (Nov. 11, 2016) (to be codified at 22 C.F.R.
pt. 121).
41. Amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Procedures for Obtaining
State Department Authorization To Export Items Subject to the Export Administration
Regulations; Revision to the Destination Control Statement; and Other Changes, 81 Fed. Reg.
54732 (Aug. 17, 2016) (to be codified at 22 C.F.R. pts. 120, 123, 124, 125, and 126).
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On September 29, DDTC issued an amendment designating Tunisia as a
"major non-NATO ally" for purposes of the ITAR; adjusting the denial
policy set forth in section 126.1 of the ITAR to reflect exemptions in U.N.
arms embargoes against Eritrea, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of
the Congo; and terminating the applicability of section 126.1 to Liberia,
Cdte d'Ivoire, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam.42

B.

DEFENSE DISTRIBUTED LITIGATION

In a 2-1 decision filed on September 20, 2016, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Texas did not err in declining to grant a motion for a
preliminary injunction against DDTC in the Defense Distributedv. U.S. Dep't
of State litigation.43 Plaintiffs-Appellants Defense Distributed and Second
Amendment Foundation Inc. had sought to enjoin DDTC from applying
the ITAR in a manner that prevents the online distribution of certain
unclassified, non-governmental technical information about 3D-printable
firearms and components. Circuit Judges Davis and Graves found that the
Government's interest in national security outweighed the PlaintiffsAppellants' interest in their First and Second Amendment rights for
purposes of the preliminary injunction analysis.44 In a lengthy dissent,
Circuit Judge Jones took issue with the majority's reasoning: "By refusing to
address the plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the merits and relying solely
on the Government's vague invocation of national security interests, the
majority leave in place a preliminary injunction that degrades First
Amendment protection and implicitly sanctions the State Department's
tenuous and aggressive invasion of citizens' rights."4s

C.

REGISTRATON GUIDANCE FOR

FIREARs

MANUFACTURERS AND

GUNSMITHS

Largely in response to public debate sparked by the Defense Distributed
litigation and aspects of the ECR Initiative, DDTC issued guidance in July
intended to clarify the distinction between firearms "gunsmithing" and
firearms "manufacturing" for purposes of ITAR registration.- Broadly
speaking, tasks such as firearms maintenance and repair, occasional kit
assembly, cosmetic changes, and after-market modifications that do not
significantly improve capabilities would not constitute "manufacturing"
42. Amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Tunisia, Eritrea, Somalia,
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, C6te d'Ivoire, Siri Lanka, Vietnam, and Other

Changes, 81 Fed. Reg. 66804 (Sept. 29, 2016) (to be codified at 22 C.F.R. pts. 120 and 126).
43. Defense Distributed v. U.S. Dep't of State, 838 F.3d 451 (5th Cir. 2016).
44. Id. at 460.
45. Id. at 476.
46. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Applicability of the ITAR Registration Requirement
to Firearms Manufacturers and Gunsmiths (July 22, 2016), https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/
compliance/documents/ITARRegReqFirearmsManufacturers.pdf
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activities that trigger the section 122 registration requirement. In contrast,
the systematized production of parts or ammunition, or the use of
specialized equipment or tooling to improve a firearm's performance beyond
its original specifications, would be registerable "manufacturing" per the
ITAR.
D.

SIGNFICANT

ITAR

ENFORCEMENT DEVELOPMENTS

On May 9, 2016, DDTC announced a partial relaxation of the statutory
debarment imposed on Rocky Mountain Instrument Company (RMI) in
2010,47 when it pleaded guilty to violating the Arms Export Control Act.48

Under the modified debarment scheme, exporters other than RMI may now
apply for and utilize DDTC authorizations to export RMI-origin defense
articles and defense services without first having to request separate
transaction exceptions to the debarment order.49
Microwave Engineering Corporation (MEC) agreed to pay a fine of USD
100,000 as part of a civil consent agreement with DDTC concluded on June
20, 2016.5o MEC had voluntarily disclosed that "deficiencies in its ITAR
compliance program" led to the release of controlled technical data
concerning communications equipment to a scientist from China employed
on an H-lB visa, on several occasions from December 2009 to June 2010.51
On October 5, 2016, Marc Turi and Turi Defense Group, Inc.
(collectively, "Turi") agreed to a suspended $200,000 fine, and to refrain
from engaging in ITAR-controlled activities for four years, to settle charges
of certain unauthorized activities subject to the ITAR.52 Specifically, DDTC
alleged that in 2011, Turi unlawfully proposed and brokered the sale of
Eastern European weapons and ammunition to persons in Libya without
authorization (although no actual deliveries were made).s3 The civil
settlement coincided with a Department of Justice decision to request
47. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs; Modification of Statutory Debarment Imposed
Pursuant to Section 127.7(c) of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations -

Rocky

Mountain Instrument Company, 81 Fed. Reg. 28113 (May 9, 2016).
48. Notice of Debarment Pursuant to Section 127.7(c) of the International Traffic in Arms

Regulations, 75 Fed. Reg. 54692 (Sept. 8, 2010).
49. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, supra note 47.

50. Microwave Engineering Corporation (U.S. Dep't of State, Bureau of Political-Military
Affairs, June 20, 2016) (consent agreement),
consent.agreements/pdf/MECCA.pdf.

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/compliance/

51. Letter from Sue Gainor, Office of Def. Trade Controls Compliance, to Suzanne Wright,
Chair of Board/President, Microwave Engineering Corp., https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/com
pliance/consent.agreements/pdf/MECCA.pdf.
52. Consent Agreement, Marc Turi and Turi Defense Group, Inc., (U.S. Dep't of State,
Bureau of Political Military Affairs, Oct. 5, 2016), https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/compliance/
consent agreements/pdf/TuriCA.pdf.
53. Letter from Arthur Shulman, Office of Def. Trade Controls Compliance, to Marc Turi,
President, Turi Defense Group, Inc., available at https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/compliance/
consent-agreements/pdf/TuriPCL.pdf.
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dismissal of a criminal case it had commenced against Turi in connection
with alleged efforts to arm anti-Qadhafi rebels in Libya.54

II. Developments Involving the Export Administration
Regulations
A.

REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS

In 2016, the BIS issued three final rules that were intended to liberalize
certain export controls that had been imposed against Cuban entities. On
January 27, 2016, the BIS promulgated a final rule that established a general
policy of approval for five types of transactions (i.e., transactions relating to
certain telecommunications items; certain commodities and software for
non-governmental entities that seek to strengthen civil society in Cuba and
to U.S. news bureaus in Cuba; certain agricultural items; and certain items
that are necessary to ensure the safety of civil aviation) and that stated that
proposed exports and re-exports of certain items to meet the needs of the
Cuban people to Cuban state-owned organizations or governmental entities
would be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.55 Next, on March 16, 2016, the
BIS published a final rule that: (1) amended the EAR to allow cargo on a
vessel that is on temporary sojourn to Cuba to transit Cuba on that vessel
under a license exception; (2) created the ability for EAR99 items and items
controlled for antiterrorism reasons only to be shipped pursuant to license
exception to persons authorized by the Office of Foreign Assets Control to
establish and maintain a physical or business presence in Cuba; and (3)
adopted a policy of case-by-case review for items that would enable or
56
facilitate exports from Cuba of items produced by the private sector.
Subsequently, on October 17, 2016, BIS issued a final rule that authorized
the use of License Exception SCP for items sold directly to individuals in
Cuba for personal use and License Exception AVS for cargo that is transiting
Cuba on aircraft that are on temporary sojourn in Cuba, and that reduced
the number of Cuban Government and Cuban Communist Party Officials
who are ineligible recipients under License Exceptions GFT, CCD, and
SCP.57
On March 8, 2016, the BIS added Zhongxing Telecommunications
Equipment (ZTE) Corporation and certain related entities to the Entity
54. Kenneth P. Vogel and Josh Gerstein, Obama DOJ Drops ChargesAgainst Alleged Broker of
Libyan Weapons, Pornico (Oct. 5, 2016) http://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/marc-turi2
libyan-rebels-hillary-clinton-2 9115.
55. Cuban Licensing Policy Revisions, 81 Fed. Reg. 4580 (Jan. 27, 2016) (to be codified at 15
CF.R. pt. 746.
56. Cuba: Revisions to License Exceptions and Licensing Policy 81 Fed. Reg. 13972 (Mar. 16,
2016) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 736, 740).
57. Cuba: Revisions to License Exceptions and Licensing Policy, 81 Fed. Reg. 13972 (Mar.
16, 2016) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R pts. 736, 740, 746).
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List.58 Subsequently, on March 24, 2016, the BIS issued an amendment to

the EAR by adding Supplement No. 7 to EAR Part 744 to create a
temporary general license to specify that exports, re-exports, and transfers of
"NLR" items were allowed from March 24, 2016, through June 30, 2016.59
The BIS extended the temporary general license in June, August, and
November 2016.60

The Commerce Department's Office of Export Enforcement (OEE)
revised its guidance regarding administrative enforcement cases based on
violations of the EAR.61 In large part, the OEE guidance is consistent with
OFAC's long-standing guidance on similar cases based on violations of the
laws and regulations it enforces. The guidance went into effect on July 22,
2016.62

In May, the Commerce Department amended the EAR to remove the
short supply license requirements that had applied to exports of crude oil
from the United States.63 In July 2016, the CCL was amended to add items
that no longer warranted control under USML Categories XIV
(Toxicological Agents) or XVIII (Directed Energy Weapons).64 The
Commerce Department issued a final rule to describe how articles that no
longer warranted control under USML Category XII (Fire Control, Laser,
Imaging, and Guidance Equipment) were to be controlled under the EAR.65

B.

SIGNIFICANT EAR

ENFORCEMENT CASES

Fokker Services B.V. (Fokker), a Netherlands company, consented to a
$10 million fine in a settlement published on June 2, 2016.66 The BIS
58. Additions to the Entity List, 81 Fed. Reg. 12004 (Mar. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 15
C.F.R. pt. 744).
59. Temporary General License, 81 Fed. Reg. 15633 (Mar. 24, 2016) (to be codified at 15
C.F.R. pt. 744).
60. Temporary General License: Extension of Validity, 81 Fed. Reg. 41799 (une 28, 2016);
Temporary General License: Extension of Validity, 81 Fed. Reg. 55372 (Aug. 19, 2016);
Temporary General License: Extension of Validity, 81 Fed. Reg. 81663 (Nov. 18, 2016).
61. Guidance on Charging and Penalty Determinations in Settlement of Administrative

Enforcement Cases, 81 Fed. Reg. 40499 (une 22, 2016) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R pt. 766).
62. Id.
63. Removal of Short Supply License Requirements on Exports of Crude Oil, 81 Fed. Reg.

29483 (May 12, 2016) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts 730, 740, 743, 744, 746, 754, 762, 772,
and 774).
64. Commerce Control List: Addition of Items Determined To No Longer Warrant Control
Under United States Munitions List Category XIV (Toxicological Agents) or Category XVIII

(Directed Energy Weapons), 81 Fed. Reg. 49517 (July 28, 2016) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts
704 and 774).
65. Revisions to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR); Control of Fire Control,
Laser, Imaging, and Guidance Equipment the President Determines No Longer Warrants

Control Under the United States Munitions List (USML), 81 Fed. Reg. 70320 (Oct. 12, 2016)
(to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts 734, 742, 744, 772, and 774).
66. Fokker Services B.V. (U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of Indus. and Sec., June 2, 2016)
(final order),
https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/export-

violations-201 5/1060-e245 8/file.
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alleged that Fokker took steps to evade the EAR while committing 253
violations by unlawfully exporting various United States-origin aircraft parts
and components to Sudan and Iran (including Iranian military end-users)
from 2005 to 2010.
On June 3, 2016, BIS announced that it was fining Weiss Envirotronics,
Inc. a civil penalty of $575,000 for the unauthorized export of controlled
environmental test chambers to China on twenty occasions between March
2010 and September 2013.67
Alcon Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (a Swiss company) and Alcon Laboratories,
Inc. (based in Texas) reached an agreement with BIS on June 29, 2016, to
pay an $8.1 million civil penalty in connection with approximately 200
unlawful shipments of United States-origin medical devices to Iran and
Syria.68 BIS alleged that personnel within the Alcon group of companies
were aware of the restrictions on such exports and routed the shipments
through third countries in an effort to circumvent U.S. requirements.
On July 22, 2016, BIS imposed a $500,000 fine and a five-year debarment
on R&A International Trading Inc. (and its owner and president, Rukhsana.
Kadri) for allegedly submitting false shipper information to the U.S.
government via the Automated Export System in an effort to conceal a
customer's identity on multiple occasions, and for making and soliciting false
statements during the BIS investigation of the inaccurate filings.69
On September 28, 2016, Technoline SAL of Beirut, Lebanon, agreed to
pay a $450,000 fine to settle charges that it unlawfully exported United
States-origin spectrometers, chromatographs, and related items to Syria (a
sanctioned country) on seven occasions between August 2009 and October
2010.70 In addition, the company was debarred from engaging in activities
subject to the EAR for a period of two years.
As part of a civil settlement announced on November 8, 2016, National
Oilwell Varco (based in Texas) and Dreco Energy Services Ltd. (based in
Alberta) agreed to pay $2.5 million in connection with unauthorized
shipments of United States-origin oil, gas, and manufacturing equipment to
Iran and Oman in 2006, 2007, and 2012.71
67. Weiss Envirotronics, Inc. (U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of Indus. and Sec., June 3,
2016) (final order), https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/exportviolations-2015/1061-e2459/file.
68. Alcon Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of Indus. and Sec., June 30,
2016) (final order), https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/1068e2466/file.
69. R&A International Trading Inc. (U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of Indus. and Sec., July
22, 2016) (final order), https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/exportviolations-2015/1072-e2470/file.
70. In re Technoline SAL (U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of Indus. and Sec., Sep. 29,
2016), available at https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/exportviolations-2015/1080-e2474/file.
71. National Oilwell Varco and Decro Energy Services Ltd (U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau
of Indus. and Sec., Nov. 8, 2016) (final order), https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/
export-violations/export-violations-2015/1085-e2477/file.
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Program for Willful
Violations
In October, the Department of Justice took a highly noticeable step into
export controls and economic sanctions compliance by issuing public
guidance for a voluntary self-disclosure (VSD) program involving potentially
willful (and hence criminal) violations.72 "This Guidance memorializes the
policy of [the National Security Division] to encourage business
organizations to voluntarily self-disclose criminal violations of the statutes
implementing the U.S. government's primary export control and sanctions
regimes" under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (JEEPA), which includes the EAR that are
currently under the authority of IEEPA.73 By providing a voluntary selfdisclosure, such disclosing entities may receive a "significantly reduced
penalty, to include the possibility of a non-prosecution agreement (NPA), a
reduced period of supervised compliance, a reduced fine and forfeiture, and
no requirement for a monitor."74 The Guidance further advises that failure
"to voluntarily disclose its export control and sanctions violations will rarely
qualify for an NPA."7s
The government further notes that this recent development is because it
has "made it a priority to pursue willful export control and sanctions
violations by corporate entities and their employees" and because "business
organizations and their employees are at the forefront of our enforcement
efforts."76 In the Guidance, the Department ofJustice notes that it presumes
harm to national security when these laws are violated.77 The Guidance also
notes some areas where harm to national security is especially aggravated,
such as where the violation involves nuclear nonproliferation, missile
technology, terrorist organizations, or systemic compliance failures.78 The
Guidance emphasizes that is it not "intended to suggest that the government
can require business organizations to voluntarily self-disclose, cooperate, or
remediate. Companies remain free to reject these options."79
Previously, the only known VSD that private parties were encouraged to
provide were directly to the regulatory agencies themselves. For instance, an
actual or potential violation could be voluntarily reported to DDTC where
the actions involve the AECA. DDTC would then determine if consultation
with the Department of Justice was warranted given the circumstances. This
72. Guidance Regarding Voluntary Self-Disclosures, Cooperation, And Remediation In
Export Control And Sanctions Investigations Involving Business Organizations, Nat'l Sec. Div.,
Dep't of Justice (Oct. 2, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/nsd/file/902491/download.
73. Id. at 2.
74. Id. at 8.
75. Id. at 9.
76. Id. at 1-2.
77. Guidance Regarding Voluntary Self-Disclosures, rupra note 72, at 3.
78. Id. at 8.
79. Id. at 4.

https://scholar.smu.edu/yearinreview/vol51/iss1/4

16

Boscariol et al.: Export Controls and Economic Sanctions
2017]

EXPORT CONTROLS & ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

39

development, however, now encourages private parties to disclose violations
to the regulatory agencies and, if there are potentially willful violations, then
also to the Department of Justice. As such, this Guidance purports to not
affect the existing VSD processes with the Departments of State,
Commerce, and Treasury.s0
This new recommended VSD process, the Department of Justice notes,
concerns only those violations that are willful. In its Guidance, the
Department of Justice notes that
[i]n export control and sanctions cases, [the government] uses the
definition of willfulness set forth in Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184
(1998). Under Bryan, an act is willful if done with the knowledge that it
is illegal. The U.S. government, however, is not required to show the
defendant was aware of the specific law, rule, or regulation that its
conduct may have violated81
Although the U.S. government argues and stresses the Bryan willfulness
standard applies to every situation, there is a federal circuit split on this
issue. 82 Therefore, counsel should review the standard in the applicable
jurisdiction.
As a practical matter, willfulness for private companies under the Bryan
standard is a minimal threshold for the U.S. government to prove because
businesses are virtually presumed to be knowledgeable of the regulations
impacting their activities83 As a consequence, the impact of the Bryan
standard on a private company could ensnare many otherwise civil violations
into potentially criminal violations, and thus cause debate whether to submit
a VSD to the Department of Justice. Additionally, this Guidance is also
broader because the Department of Justice assumes that national security is
harmed when these laws are violated: "Almost all criminal violations of U.S.
export controls and sanctions harm the national security or have the
potential to cause such harm."84 By contrast, experience with the
Departments of State and Commerce have shown that they stress harm to
national security in more limited contexts.85
The Guidance, however, is limited on what types of reduced liability a
disclosing entity might receive. "In determining what credit to give an
organization that voluntarily self-discloses illegal export control or sanctions
80. Id. at 3.
81. Id. at 4 fn. 5.
82. United States v. Roth, 642 F. Supp. 2d 796 (E.D. Tenn. 2009) (describing differing
standards for willfulness).
83. See United States v. Zhen Zhou Wu, 711 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2013); see also United States
v. Bishop, 740 F.3d 927 (4th Cit. 2014) (individual may have willfulness where he or she
possesses ability to understand a license may be required prior to export).
84. Guidance Regarding Voluntary Self-Disclosures, supra note 72, at 3.
85. For instance, the ITAR distinguishes items based on whether they are designated as
Significant Military Equipment. See 22 C.F.R. 120.7. Also, the EAR specifically identifies
whether an item is controlled for national security reasons. See 15 C.F.R. 774.
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conduct, fully cooperates, and remediates flaws in its controls and
compliance program, federal prosecutors must balance the goal of
encouraging such disclosures and cooperation with the goal of deterring
these very serious offenses."86 In submitting a voluntary self-disclosure, the
following elements must be met:
* The company discloses the conduct "prior to an imminent threat of
disclosure or government investigation," U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(g)(1);
* The company discloses the conduct to CES and the appropriate
regulatory agency "within a reasonably prompt time after becoming
aware of the offense," U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(g)(1), with the burden on the
company to demonstrate timeliness; and
* The company discloses all relevant facts known to it, including all
relevant facts about the individuals involved in any export control or
sanctions violation.87
Additionally, once a VSD is made, the Department of Justice will consider
a number of factors to determine whether any leniency towards the
disclosing entity is appropriate.98 The essence of these factors is whether the
disclosing entity has provided full cooperation by participating proactively,
provided all the material facts, and provided access to key employees and
documents89 Furthermore, disclosing entities are also expected to
implement an effective compliance program, discipline employees that
caused the violations, and take further necessary steps as appropriate.90
Disclosing entities that provide less than full cooperation may nevertheless
receive some leniency.9l The Guidance notes that "eligibility for
cooperation credit is not predicated upon the waiver of the attorney-client
privilege or work product protection."92
One additional point about this Guidance is its relation to the new
guidelines that were published in September 2015 (referred to as the "Yates
Memo") that altered the Department of Justice's policy towards prosecuting
employees of corporations for violations of federal laws, and providing
cooperation credit for corporations.93 The Guidance specifically states that
its purpose is to also implement the Yates Memo by "promoting greater
accountability for individual corporate defendants."94 Thus, a voluntary selfdisclosure addressing potential criminal liability by the entity may result in a
focus by the Department of Justice (under the Yates Memo) on the actual
employees of the entity who were specifically involved in the violations.
86. Guidance Regarding Voluntary Self-Disclosures, supra note 72, at 3.
87. Id. at 5.
88. Id. at 5-6.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 7-8.
91. Guidance Regarding Voluntary Self-Disclosures, .upra note 72, at 6-7.
92. Id. at 6.
93. Memorandum from Sally Yates, Deputy Attorney General on Individual Accountability
for Corporate Wrongdoing (Sep. 9, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/
download.
94. Id. at 2.
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VI. Changes to Canadian Sanctions against Iran, Russia,
Ukraine, Belarus, and Egypt
The year 2016 was an active year in Canadian economic sanctions and
export controls legislation and included updates in Canada's United Nations
and autonomous sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran, autonomous
sanctions against Russian and Ukraine, and the expiration of sanctions
against certain Egyptian nationals. Canada also took a major step in relaxing
certain export controls by beginning the process of removing Belarus from
the Area Control List, which should significantly ease the burden for
Canadian persons and entities seeking to do business in Belarus.
Canadian developments are critical for U.S. companies that have either
Canadian affiliates or Canadian personnel. Given that Canadian sanctions
law can found jurisdiction through nationality, actions by a foreign company
using a Canadian national risks exposing personnel to personal criminal
liability. Such actions can also risk tainting the Canadian affiliate either
directly or via Canada's criminal corporate liability provisions.

A.

IRAN

On February 5, 2016, Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Stiphane
Dion, announced that Canada had revised its economic sanctions against
Iran in the Regulations Amending the Special Economic Measures (Iran)
Regulations (the "Iran Regulations")95 and Regulations Amending the
Regulations Implementing the United Nations Resolutions on Iran ("Canada's UN
Regulations"),96 enacted pursuant to the Special Economic Measures Act
(SEMA)97 and the United Nations Act, respectively.
In the Iran Regulations, Canada has made significant amendments to the
list of designated persons, now referred to as "listed persons," who are
subject to a general asset freeze and transaction ban. The number of listed
individuals has been halved, from 83 to 41. The number of listed entities has
been reduced from 530 to only 161.
The trade embargo has been significantly relaxed. The prohibitions
against making investments in Iran, restricting port services to Iranian
vessels, or providing flagging or classification services to Iranian oil tankers
or cargo vessels have all been completely lifted. Canada also removed the
restrictions against importing or purchasing any goods from Iran and the
blanket financial services ban.
95. Global Affairs Canada, Regulations Amending the Special Economic Measures (Iran) Regulations
(Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.international.gc.ca/sanctions/countries-pays/iransema-regulationsiran_1mesyreglement.aspx?lang=eng (amending S.C. 1992, c. 17 (Can.)).
96. Global Affairs Canada, Regulations Amending the Regulations Implementing the United
Nations Resolutions on Iran (July 20, 2015), http://www.international.gc.calsanctions/countriespays/iran-unregulations-iran-onureglement.aspx?lang=eng.
97. Special Economic Measures Act, S.C. 1992, c.17 (Can.), http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/
acts/S-14.5/FullText.htnl.
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Under the Iran Regulations, Canada has lifted the broad supply ban by
repealing that section and replacing it with a prohibition on supplying goods
and technology, which lists 41 categories of items commonly used in
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs, including certain
centrifuges, autoclaves, fibrous or filamentary materials, gamma-ray
spectrometers, and specialty metals.
Canadian businesses, and American businesses with Canadian personnel
or affiliates, also need to review the remaining restrictions in place under
Canada's UN Regulations. These relate to activities involving nuclear
proliferation, military and conventional arms programs, and ballistic missile
development.
Canadian corporations are still required to obtain appropriate export
permits under the Export and Import Permits Act (EIPA)98 for any goods or
technology listed on Canada's Export Control List (ECL). While Canada
has now allowed trade with Iran, the Canada Border Services Agency will
likely continue to scrutinize exports to Iran to ensure compliance with
economic sanctions and export controls. Also, although the notice is silent
in regards to items originated in the United States, all goods or technology
of U.S. origin, regardless of sensitivity, should be exported or transferred to
Iran with an appropriate permit from the Export Controls Division.
B.

RussiA

AND UKRINE

On March 18, 2016, marking the second anniversary of the Russian
occupation of the Crimean region of Ukraine, the Canadian government
expanded its sanctions against Russia and Ukraine by adding 19 entities and
individuals to its lists of designated blacklisted persons. The amendments
also provide a new basis for which entities may be blacklisted under the
Russia sanctions.
Under Schedule 1 of the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations (the
"Russia Regulations")99 and the Special Economic Measures (Ukraine)
Regulations (the "Ukraine Regulations"),1oo both implemented pursuant to
the SEMA, Canada imposes broad prohibitions against engaging in activities
involving 279 entities and individuals listed as designated persons, including
these present additions.
The amendments also provide a new basis for listing persons or entities
for purposes of the broad prohibitions described above. Previously, the
listing of entities owned and controlled by, or acting on behalf of, a
designated person did not include persons listed solely because they were an
associate or family member of a designated person. This distinction has
98. Export and Import Permits Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-19, http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/
acts/E-19/.

99. Special

Economic Measures

(Russia)

Regulations,

SOR/2014-58

(Can.),

http://

laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/SOR-2014-58/FullText.html.

100. Special Economic Measures (Ukraine) Regulations, SOR/2014-60 (Can.), http://awslois.justice.ge.ca/eng/regulations/SOR-2014-60/FullText.htnl.
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been eliminated, and now entities owned or controlled by, or acting on
behalf of, an associate or family member of a designated person may be listed
in Schedule 1.
Under its Ukraine sanctions, Canada also imposes a broad trade embargo
against the Crimea region of Ukraine, including investment, supply,
sourcing, services, and technical data prohibitions. Lastly, the Russia
Regulations contain prohibitions on the export or diversion of certain listed
items, used heavily in the oil and gas industry, to Russia or any person in
Russia for use in offshore, arctic, or shale oil exploration and production.
Services associated with such goods are also prohibited.

C.

BELARUS

On May 7, 2016, Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs announced that
Canada initiated a process to remove Belarus from the Area Control List
("ACL")-a regulation to the EIPA.I This decision was made due to
Canada's recognition that the Belarusian government has made some
progress in key areas, including releasing numerous political prisoners,
conducting a presidential election, and participating in mediation efforts
regarding Ukraine and the Crimean Region.
D.

EGYPT

On March 10, 2016, Canada enacted the Regulations Amending the
Freezing Assets of Corrupt Foreign Officials (Tunisia and Egypt)
Regulationsl02 that repealed provisions concerning Egypt in the Freezing
Assets of Corrupt Foreign Officials (Tunisia and Egypt) Regulations
("Tunisia and Egypt Regulations").103
Overall, Canada introduced a number of important amendments in 2016
that had a significant impact on the way Canadian companies approach their
business dealings on the market in Iran, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Egypt.
Given the tight economic and political bond between Canada and the
United States, Canada might be expecting further significant amendments in
sanctions against these and other countries after January 2017.
Of particular importance will be the impact on U.S. corporations with
foreign affiliates if the executive orders made to implement the JCPOA are
repealed or if key components of the Cuban economic embargo are reimplemented. These actions may create issues for companies that have
begun transactions with either Iran or Cuba through Canadian subsidiaries
101. Global Affairs Canada, Notice to Exporters: Exports of items listed on the Export ControlList to
Belarus (May 13, 2016), http://www.international.gc.ca/controls-controles/systems-systemes/
excol-ceed/notices-avis/197.aspx?lang=eng.
102. Regulations Amending the Freezing Assets of Corrupt Foreign Officials (Tunisia and
2

/

Egypt) Regulations, SOR/2016-41 (Can.) (Mar. 11, 2016), http://www.gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p
2016/2016-03-23/html/sor-dors4l-eng.php.

103. Id. (repealing selected provisions from Freezing Assets of Corrupt Foreign Officials

(Tunisia) Regulations, SOR/2011-78 (Can.)).
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or affiliates. The latter case is particularly troubling because the Canadian
blocking order prohibiting compliance with the embargo remains active.
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